The referendum lie

The thing that stands out after all these years is the dishonesty. Not the improper rejection of hundreds of valid No votes by separatist scrutineers, or the No side’s subversion of the funding restrictions. The whole thing was a lie from start to finish.

Ostensibly, the referendum of 1995 was held to determine whether, in the convoluted language of the ballot question, Quebec should become “sovereign,” after making a “formal offer of a new economic and political partnership” with the rest of Canada, “based on the agreement signed on June 12, 1995.” And that’s the abridged version.

The terms “sovereign” and “partnership” were left unexplained, as was the mysterious agreement of June 12: many voters undoubtedly went to the polls believing it was an agreement between Quebec and Canada -- the economic and political partnership, perhaps -- and not merely a political deal among those three titans, Jacques Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard and Mario Dumont. But never mind: the broad understanding was that sovereignty was to be accompanied by at least the offer of partnership, if not the reality.

But, as he was later to boast, that was never Mr. Parizeau’s intent. Whatever his other failings, the former premier was no dummy. He knew that separation could never be brought about by the sort of mutual agreement in which Mr. Bouchard apparently believed, and on which the partnership proposal depended: that way lay an endless series of negotiations on every issue under the sun, followed by referendums -- probably in each province -- followed by more negotiations. And that was even assuming the rest of Canada bargained in good faith.

No, it could only be done, as it were, by a putsch: a lightning-fast series of moves to establish Quebec’s independence as a fait accompli, which the rest of Canada would have no choice but to accept. It would all be done in a week at most, sooner if possible, taking maximum advantage of the disarray and inertia in Ottawa that was already evident. That was the plan. That, not the leisurely negotiations the referendum question implied, was what Quebecers were voting on, whether they knew it or not. And that is what Mr. Parizeau would have done had he received even 50% of the vote.

For their part, the federalists campaigned on premises that were no less false. Granted, I don’t think Jean Chretien ever explicitly said he would accept a Yes vote as a mandate to negotiate the breakup of the country, but that was certainly what was implied, if only by his participation in the campaign. Yet the Prime Minister of Canada has no legal authority to do any such thing. And if he did, it is quite clear from subsequent statements that Mr. Chretien, for one, would not have recognized the referendum result as valid: not, certainly, on such a close vote, and on such a misleading question.

We did not, then, “almost lose the country” on October 30, 1995, as is so often claimed. Neither side had any intention of entering the negotiations on separation/partnership to which both sides had committed themselves, explicitly or implicitly, in the event of a Yes vote. Nor could Mr. Parizeau’s plot have had any chance of success. The notion that the Cree, to take just one example, would have meekly submitted to being abducted from Canada is as far-fetched as the claim that the Americans, or anyone else, would have recognized a unilateral declaration of independence. Far the greater likelihood was chaos: in the streets, in the courts, in the financial markets. It’s probable the whole thing would have collapsed within days, but not before causing immense harm to the province, and to the country as a whole.

Yet as frighteningly close as that prospect was, in some ways the referendum was the best thing that could have happened to Canada, by virtue of its very closeness. For one thing, it has robbed the separatists of any possibility of another “moral” victory. In any subsequent exercise, anything short of a majority must be not only an absolute but a moral defeat, since it will be less than they got the last time. But they are never going to get anywhere close to a majority, because of another of the referendum’s consequences: the Clarity Act.

It is hard to imagine now, but there was a time when a good part of the political class in this country accepted that Quebec had a right to secede unilaterally -- without need of constitutional amendments, or negotiations, or lawful means of any kind. They could do so, what is more, on any question the separatists devised, with any majority they deemed adequate. It took the madness of October 30 to frighten people into their senses.

But the Clarity Act is hardly hardline. (Indeed, it is hardly clear: neither a “clear” majority nor a “clear” question are defined.) Most mature democracies forbid secession outright; in those few states where it is allowed, the process is entirely dictated by the national government. In Canada, it was all we could do to say to Quebec: You can secede, so long as you really want to. And so long as you negotiate the terms with the rest of us.

But this, too, is a lie: As I’ve said, it is not practically possible to negotiate your way out of Confederation. What the Act allows in principle it forbids in practice. Not that I’m complaining. It may be a lie, but given its provenance, a less ignoble one than most.