The latest separatist smackdown
Or in other words: The Prime Minister has lately issued a statement denouncing the newly elected Parti Québécois leader for vowing to “ignore” the Clarity Act in the event of a separatist referendum victory. “Mr. Boisclair has indicated he would not be bound by the provisions of the Clarity Act,” the statement notes in shocked tones. “Mr. Boisclair's declaration amounts to a rejection of the rule of law in favour of political expediency.”
Wait a minute: Paul Martin supports the Clarity Act? Shouldn’t somebody tell Jean Lapierre?
Mr. Martin, you’ll recall, hid for a week when the Clarity Act was first introduced, only finally emerging at the last possible moment to vote in favour of it. On the other hand, he showed no such hesitancy in appointing, shortly after taking over as Prime Minister, the founding member of the Bloc Quebecois as his Quebec lieutenant. Mr. Lapierre’s first act on taking office was to declare the Clarity Act “useless.” Which ordinarily would have sent reporters racing off to get reaction from Stephane Dion, the act’s intellectual godfather as minister of intergovernmental affairs, except that Mr. Martin had also dumped Mr. Dion from cabinet.
But now all is forgiven, not to say forgotten. Mr. Dion has since been restored to cabinet, and was recently let off his leash to launch his own attacks on Mr. Boisclair. And Mr. Martin is invoking the Clarity Act, the single most celebrated achievement of his hated rival Jean Chretien, as his talisman against the separatist threat.
Well, all right. That’s progress, I suppose. Except the crisis Mr. Martin sees in Mr. Boisclair’s statement is more apparent than real. Never mind that Mr. Boisclair has yet to be elected premier, or to hold a referendum, let alone win one. Never mind, too, as Tory leader Stephen Harper was rude enough to point out, that the Liberals are the last people to be talking about the rule of law in Quebec. There is nothing untoward in Mr. Boisclair’s declaration that he would not be bound by the Clarity Act, since the act does not apply to the government of Quebec. It is binding only on the federal government.
Contrary to popular myth, the act does not commit the federal government to negotiate should the separatists win a referendum. (The Supreme Court ruling in the secession reference does -- but, again contrary to myth, it does not say what it would have to negotiate. Specifically, it does not say the feds must offer secession, or that they must accept it if proposed.)
Rather, it expressly forbids the federal government to enter negotiations unless certain conditions are met: namely, that the referendum should have been won by a “clear” majority on a “clear” question. What is “clear,” moreover, is in fact left splendidly murky: it would be up to Parliament to decide.
The question, then, is not whether Mr. Boisclair would be bound by the Clarity Act, but whether Mr. Martin would. The Prime Ministier’s earlier ambivalence cannot fail to have been noticed in Quebec City -- on both sides of the National Assembly. It was an overt signal of weakness, a weakness that has already been exploited by the “federalist” government of Jean Charest, and would be sure to be probed by any separatist regime.
The Clarity Act constrains the government of Quebec only so far as it concedes that negotiations with the government of Canada are necessary. That’s something the separatists don’t like to admit. But however ambiguous the Supreme Court may have been on Canada’s obligations after a referendum, it is crystal clear on the seceding province’s: secession can only be lawfully achieved, if at all, by means of the necessary constitutional amendments, requiring negotiations not only with the federal government but with the other nine provinces. And the guarantor of that is not some imagined federalist army, but the desire of Quebecers, in common with most other peoples, to live within a system based on the rule of law.
While Mr. Chretien remained Prime Minister, it was a safe bet that no separatist government would dare to put a question that was not “clear” to a referendum. In that event, Ottawa would simply refuse to recognize the result, and without negotiations there could be no lawful secession. On the other hand, with a “clear” question -- meaning no reassuring hedges about “association” or “partnership” with the rest of Canada -- they could never hope to win.
But under Mr. Martin’s wobbly leadership, nothing is certain. Suppose Premier Boisclair did ask a fudged question, a la 1995, backed by the threat of a unilateral declaration of independence if Ottawa refused to negotiate. Can anyone say with confidence that Mr. Martin would have the nerve to stare him down?





