BY THE END of 1987, controversy over the Meech Lake constitutional accord was building to a grand national battle that promises to embroil much of the new year.

The divide, roughly drawn, is between the centralist, federalist, statist traditions long dominant in the governance of Canada and in political and historical accounts of the nation's rise, and the various strands of opposition to this prevailing ideology, which have not until now entwined.

The achievement of the Mulroney government is to have drawn the dissenters together under a slowly unfurling philosophical umbrella. However one views either Meech Lake or free trade, it remains true that the Tories alone can claim consistency of position: in broad essentials one either supports both, or opposes both - not, as the Liberals and NDP have done, support one and attack the other.

It need not have turned out this way. Meech Lake should by any reasonable standards of expectation simply have concluded the long, difficult task of defining Quebec's place in Confederation.

The Constitution of 1982 left this problem unresolved, as Pierre Trudeau's old adversary, Quebec Premier Rene Levesque, refused to sign the agreement. But the departure from political life of the two masters of the black-and-white left the way clear for two artists of the grey area: Brian Mulroney and Robert Bourassa.

Bourassa's Liberal Party had arrived at five conditions for acceptance of the Constitution while in Opposition. A distillation of the traditional demands of Quebec nationalists, they were put forward as official government policy in the spring of 1986, following Bourassa's December, 1985 election triumph.

They included: a veto for Quebec on constitutional change; a role in the appointment of Supreme Court judges; limits on federal powers to spend in areas of provincial jurisdiction; greater control over immigration; and, most critically, designation of Quebec as a ''distinct society.''

But the demands for special powers and status, as in the past, ran up against stiff resistance from the other provinces, and it appeared this attempt to reconcile Quebec to the Constitution, like those previous, would end in failure. The deadlock was resolved, in an all-night, closed-door session of negotiations commencing April 30 at Meech Lake, in effect by giving every province the same rights as Quebec demanded. Although the agreement was drawn up in final form and slightly modified in a further meeting June 2-3 in the Langevin Block of the Parliament buildings in Ottawa, it is forever known as the Meech Lake Accord.

What was once a matter only of Quebec now became a fundamental redrawing of the nation, just as free trade has become much more than the classical ideal of tariff elimination. Any changes to the Constitution involving the Commons, Senate, Supreme Court, or the creation of new provinces would require provincial unanimity, so giving every province a veto.

Senators and Supreme Court appointments would be drawn by the federal government from lists of nominees prepared by the provinces. Every province would have the right to opt out of shared-cost programs with compensation, provided their own versions met national objectives. Every province was given expanded powers over immigration.

And Quebec was recognized as a ''distinct society'' within a country of which a ''fundamental characteristic'' was said to be ''the existence of French-speaking Canadians, centred in but not limited to Quebec, and English-speaking Canadians, concentrated outside Quebec but also present in Quebec'' - the old deux nations concept, in less tortured language.

The euphoria was almost universal after the deal was signed, though some strong opposition later emerged.

By the time the House of Commons voted on the accord, 11 Liberals opposed it, two Tories, and two New Democrats. But the bill, with the support of 242 other MPs, passed easily all the same.

Most of the accord needs the approval only of the usual seven provinces with 50% of the population. But changes to the amending formula and the Supreme Court require unanimity. If any province objects, or fails to ratify the agreement by the June, 1990 deadline, Meech Lake will fall.

By yearend, three provinces, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, had ratified the deal. Others seem more inclined to take their time, announcing they will hold hearings on the deal.

There are two axes of debate over the accord: federal vs provincial rights, and federalism vs Quebec nationalism. Some opponents fear the agreement's transfer of powers to the provinces could hurt the quality or availability of federally funded social programs, prevent the Territories from gaining provincial status, or paralyze needed constitutional change.

SPRINGBOARD

Others are more concerned over the ''distinct society'' clause. They see it as a threat to individual rights generally, and to the rights of women, natives, and ethnic groups in particular. And by enshrining the deux nations ideal in the Constitution, they see the accord as not simply appeasing Quebec nationalists, but providing a springboard for separatism.

Supporters of the deal argue that these worries are overdrawn or unfounded, and that whatever the cost, this is the least any Quebec government is ever likely to accept as the price of accepting the Constitution. They argue, moreover, that it entails a new idea of federalism, arranged in such delicate balance that any further amendments would jeopardize the whole deal.

But opponents, many grouped under the Canadian Coalition on the Constitution's banner, vow to turn up the heat. Battle fronts in 1988: - The Senate. The upper house can stall the bill ratifying the accord for up to six months, that is, until April. By that time, much could have changed. - New Brunswick, where accord signatory Richard Hatfield was destroyed by Liberal Frank McKenna in October. The new premier has expressed strong misgivings about the deal. - Manitoba, where NDP Premier Howard Pawley, under pressure from party members to oppose the accord, found in the free trade treaty an excuse to back out of his initial guarded support for Meech Lake - the thin claim that the trade pact was so bad his faith in co-operative federalism had been broken.

But it is clear that, in political terms, it is simply not on for one province to scotch the accord. Expectations have been built too high in Quebec; the consequences of rejection are too ghastly to contemplate, just as defeat of the free trade initiative would provoke the West into open revolt.

With support for the Parti Quebecois, which has denounced the deal as a sellout, already freshening off the emotional swell following Levesque's death and the return of the charismatic separatist zealot Jacques Parizeau, Bourassa would have his legs cut out from under him. At best, he would be forced into a more hard-line posture; at worst, the province could turn again to separatism.

Those seeking to kill the accord must rest their hopes on developing a new federalist movement and leaders in Quebec, akin to Trudeau and his followers. There is slim chance of this, it must be said, in any plausible forecast.

Nonetheless, opponents may be able to stall the accord and force some changes to the more upsetting items, thereby calling Ottawa's and Quebec's bluff on the delicate-balance argument. The 1988 First Ministers' Conference on the Constitution would give them their opportunity.

And a final link with free trade: If the government is forced by opposition or enticed by support for the trade deal to ask the governor-general to dissolve Parliament and call an election before Senate approval, Meech Lake would die on the order paper. Would a Liberal or NDP government revive it?