A young, vigorous new leader; a greater frankness with the people; a sharp swerve from mistaken policies of the past, hinting at bolder turns to come - yes, glasnost (or openness) is alive within the walls of the Bank of Canada.

Experienced Bank kremlinologists caution, however, that Governor John Crow's policy of ''new thinking,'' his determined attempt to shake years of encrusted inflation from the economy, faces difficult tests in months to come from ideological hardliners, who hold fast to the doctrine of easy money.

In recent weeks it has been hard to make oneself heard above the calls for lower interest rates. The Chamber of Commerce was the first, in a brief to the Finance minister last December. While it had ''strongly supported the Bank of Canada's efforts to contain inflation, a change of emphasis is indicated in a period of slow growth,'' the Chamber's statement quavered.

The issue has provoked the usual fierce but substantive debate among the three major parties. An NDP policy paper in January demanded that the Finance minister order a one percentage point drop in interest rates. Tory MP Paul McCrossan suggested instead that the Finance minister ''lean on'' the Governor to lower interest rates, while Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa, who one supposes speaks as much as anyone for the Liberals on major issues these days, thought the minister should ''persuade'' the Bank to cut rates.

VILIFICATION

To his credit, Finance Minister Michael Wilson said last week he would do no such thing. But it seems likely that the vilification of Crow will continue. The Governor is said to be out of control, to be dictating policy to the government. NDP Finance critic Michael Cassidy, in one of the zanier outbursts, found it deeply disturbing that the Governor should be able to resign if directed to pursue a policy he disagreed with. It wasn't clear how this terrible state of affairs would be remedied, although Cassidy seemed to stop short of conscription. More particularly, Crow is said to be obsessed with inflation, at the expense of growth.

The crisis must clearly have reached an advanced stage, if the intricacies of monetary policy are to be entrusted to politicians. Perhaps the Justice minister should sit on the Supreme Court, just to be on the safe side. What is the extent of the crisis? Well, interest rates are down 3 1/2 points since the Tories took power, as is the unemployment rate; nearly 500,000 jobs have been created in the past year alone, on the strength of 5% real growth. Mortgage rates are dropping, bond markets are buoyant - yes, all the telltale signs of collapse are there.

That, however, is not really the point. If growth were slower, Crow's critics would not be any more justified, though they would undoubtedly be louder. Their arguments, in the main, boil down to this: a little inflation is a good thing. This suggests a willful ignorance of lessons most painfully learned in the chaos of the previous decade. It is part of no economic tradition, the product of no economic analysis. It is the purest populism; which is to say, opportunism; which is to say, fraud.

The harmless speck of inflation supposed to remain is small only when set against the vast balloon of the 1970s and early 1980s. By historic standards, 4%- plus inflation is high. Before the onslaught of the Great Inflation in 1973, there had been only five years since the War when it reached that level. The Spanish Empire of the 16th and 17th centuries was destroyed by chronic inflation of just 3%.

The only ''acceptable'' level of inflation is zero - not at the expense of growth and employment, but for their better promotion. In an economy based on money, where decisions are based on prices expressed in money terms, it is vital that those prices send clear signals, undistorted by inflationary ''white noise.''

FOOLING PEOPLE

Some in the easy money crowd may protest that they are not in favor of inflation, but only of ''supporting growth'' or ''full employment.'' But they speak of ends for which monetary policy is not fit means. Goosing the money supply expands demand, but it says nothing of supply's ability to respond. It can determine the rate of growth of nominal spending, but not how that splits between real growth and inflation.

The only way in which monetary policy can boost growth above levels determined by the fundamental factors of population and productivity is by fooling people: by raising inflation faster than workers raise their wage demands, for example, so depressing real wages and increasing the demand for labor; or by persuading bondholders to accept nominal yields that do not fully compensate for inflation, so reducing real interest rates. This is not a game that can be played any longer.

Ultimately, inflation is a matter not only of economics, but of politics, both in causes and effects. The issuance of currency began as a political act, establishing the legitimacy of the state, and with the breakdown of the currency comes the breakdown of the state. Keynes's admonition, that the surest way to undermine established order is by ''debauching the currency,'' is well known. It is less often recorded that he was quoting Lenin at the time.