Those distracting appearances in court on charges of corruption and tax evasion now but an unpleasant memory, Count Otto Lambsdorff finds much time today for relaxed contemplation of the world around him.

He is in Toronto to lecture on the June economic summit of the leading industrial nations; as West German Economics minister, he sat in on seven previous such affairs. Padding about the hotel room in a wine-colored cardigan and slippers, he dismisses current efforts at policy co-ordination with some contempt.

''I could write the communique for the Toronto Summit now,'' he sighs. ''Nothing has changed. The leaders are ready to sign a communique knowing they are unwilling or unable to fulfill what they have signed. The summit has become a waste of time. My personal suggestion is to skip it.''

As instantly appealing as that invitation may be, one cannot escape the thought that the Count has things rather backward. A year after international policy co- ordination reached its highwater mark in the Louvre Accord, it is safe to say the world will get along a deal better so long as the leaders mumble nice things at one another in front of the microphones, and go their separate ways on actual policy. The time they start living by their commitments is the time to start filling the basement with grain.

PHONY INTERNATIONALISM

Macroeconomic policy co-ordination of the Louvre Accord sort is an example of what might be called phony internationalism. At best, it amounts to telling countries to do in the global interest what they should be doing in their own interest anyway. At worst, it means forcing nations already following a policy in their own best interest onto some other course imagined to be in the global interest, which turns out to be in neither interest really. Either way, the long-term health and stability of the world economy is not advanced, but retarded.

There were three elements to the Louvre Accord, the attempt by finance ministers from the seven leading economies to pull the world's financial system out of the cycle of current account imbalances threatening, then as now, to drag it under. First, the U.S. promised to reduce its budget deficit, to reduce its dependence on foreign savings and the consequent necessity of running massive trade deficits. Second, Japan and Germany pledged to expand demand in their economies and suck in more U.S. exports. Third, they agreed central banks should support the US$ at then current levels, calling a halt to its two-year descent.

The first two of these were ignored from the start, while the third was only latterly abandoned. The U.S. administration, believing it could rely on its partners to bear the brunt of adjustment, dawdled away the months without progress on the budget. Japan and Germany each made the requisite nods in the direction of demand stimulus, without easing significantly. It was left to the central banks to try to hold the agreement together. The U.S. Federal Reserve abruptly ceased to create dollars, while central banks overseas bought more than US$120 billion on the open market, until the Crash confirmed the failure of the accord.

Each of these elements casts its own light on the folly of international co- operation in economic policy. First is the substitution of rules for will. Rather than summoning the political will to tackle deficit reduction on its own merits, on the basis of the damage and distortion it was inflicting upon the domestic economy, regardless of the demands of others, the Reagan administration relied on a rule to bind it to the task. But of course, as happens whenever rules conflict with will, the rule was overturned.

The same held true for earlier attempts at international economic co-operation. The gold standard lasted as a monetary rule for just as long as the U.S. cared to let it; as soon as it conflicted with the Nixon administration's will to finance its war effort by inflation, it was discarded. The General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade was an attempt to set rules against trade barriers; but given the will to go on erecting barriers, member states have simply found new ways around the rules.

FISCAL FOOLS

Second is the tendency to the lowest common denominator. Co-ordination most often means dragging nations of sounder macroeconomic mind down to the level of fiscal fools. As it is, Germany and Japan are running well over their money supply targets, while each faces worrisome debt-GNP ratios. Further stimulus would have marginal impact on trade imbalances, at risk of higher inflation and unmanageable debt. Their footdragging is in order.

Last is the mismatch of domestic policy instruments with foreign targets. The subordination of monetary policy in each country to the external value of the currency left its internal value wildly uncertain. The Fed's sharp contraction caused the stock market to seize up in October; it was only when the US$ was set free again after the Crash that order returned.

The enduring belief in international policy co-ordination reflects a belief in an inherent economic conflict between the self-interest of each individual nation and the general interest of all. No such conflict exists. Sound policy for one nation - liberal trade, honest money, fiscal balance - is sound policy for the world.