A close reading of the Newfoundland counterproposals, to take the most hard- line opponent of the deal as our example, will find every one of Quebec's original five conditions for accepting the 1982 Constitution is substantially satisfied. The real difference between Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells is over process.

In particular, Mulroney holds, first, that all constitutional change should require unanimous consent, whereas Wells believes a substantial majority is generally enough; second, that Quebec's concerns, as the holdout, should be dealt with in isolation, whereas Wells would integrate them into a broader constitutional agenda.

The first is chiefly a question of constitutional philosophy, while the second is a matter of negotiating tactics. But they interact to define two sharply divergent paths to constitutional progress.

It is not enough simply to declare a general principle of unanimity, or to use such to justify a veto for one province in a given case. Whether unanimity applies in the particular should depend on the legitimacy of the holdout's claim, in the abstract on the likelihood of its attainment.

Ontario Premier David Peterson no doubt thought himself clever for noting at November's First Ministers' Conference, after Wells had thundered that ''no one province can hold up the constitutional development of this nation forever,'' that Wells's logic could rebound on him.

In fact, Wells is not alone. Manitoba and New Brunswick are also opposed to the agreement as it stands. But even if he were, the parallel between Quebec's position in 1981 and Newfoundland's in 1989 is specious. Newfoundland has the legal right to veto an agreement on which unanimity is constitutionally required. Quebec never had a legal veto before, during, or after the 1981 constitutional round - nor would it if Meech failed.

The other provinces would be within their rights, specifically, to reform the Senate without Quebec's participation, and to bind Quebec to the result. Quebec's present ''veto'' is a construct of emotional blackmail on the part of Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa and the political interests of the Prime Minister. If it is anything, it is a ''moral'' veto. There is no reason a priori that Newfoundland should not be granted the same moral legitimacy.

The same inconsistency marks the federal government's position on the likelihood of unanimity. On the one hand, constant reference is made to the ''miracle'' of Meech Lake in achieving unanimity as an argument against reopening the accord. On the other hand, we are assured the Accord's requirement of unanimity for Senate reform or the admission of new provinces does not represent a significant obstacle to progress.

But we needn't leave it at that. To say ''either unanimity is possible, or it is impossible'' is to oversimplify. How possible unanimity is in each instance depends, clearly, on the question involved. There is good reason to believe, given the self-interest of those at the table, that unanimity on Senate reform would be next to impossible. That, one suspects, explains Ontario's fervent support of Meech Lake, more than any sudden flowering of statesmanship on Peterson's part.

Conversely, the ''impossibility'' of achieving unanimity again on Meech Lake is only a fact so long as its proponents insist it is. There is no reason to think an agreement could not be struck that met Quebec's bottom-line concerns, without Meech Lake's extra baggage.

How to apply the tests of legitimacy and likelihood will in turn depend on one's understanding of the purpose of requiring unanimity. From a functional standpoint, it is a means of preventing change: a legal vault, into which especially prized parts of the Constitution - such as the Crown, or the use of English and French - may be placed for safekeeping. The lock cannot be opened unless all 11 governments turn the key at once.

Unanimity here is but one application among many of the concept of the veto. Whether all provinces, some provinces or one province should have a veto will vary according to the nature and importance of the clause in question. It is a legal device, applying only as specified in law. There are no ''moral'' vetos.

The other purpose of unanimity is to safeguard not the Constitution itself, but the claims of its signatories. The focus here is not on the substance of the issue, but the prerogatives of the provinces. For Mulroney, all that matters is that Quebec and every province can sign every amendment with ''honor and enthusiasm.'' Whether this forecloses the likelihood of constitutional change is irrelevant; any objection is legitimate.

''For me,'' he lectured Wells, ''a constitution is not something to be imposed on anybody. A constitution is an instrument of generosity and unity designed to bring people together and has moral value only to the extent that people knowingly and lovingly adhere to it.''

It's possible Mulroney truly believes this sentimental pap. Mulroney wants to be liked by everyone, and so may wish the same for constitutional amendments. But the result in each case is the same: either total paralysis, or progress only on the basis of the lowest common denominator.

The implication of this approach is that all amendments effectively require unanimity, not just those identified in law as such. It is not a legalistic mechanism, but a moral obligation; not simply one form of veto, but the only acceptable form. For otherwise, the Constitution will have been ''imposed'' on one or other party, and we can't have that.

To insist on unanimity at all times is not only unworkable; it reflects a thoroughly debased idea of democracy. It is not only to give every province an equal say in constitutional change, since they could have that merely by voting on it. It is to give every province the whole say: to insist that any change must be agreeable to everybody, and that any one government can bind all the others.

It is critical that these two purposes be kept separate. We must get away from the idea that any time Quebec or any province is outvoted, it should be considered a ''humiliation'' and provoke a full-blown constitutional crisis.

Mulroney was waxing lyrical about developments in East Germany at the close of the conference, citing the Meech Lake controversy as an example of the democracy German refugees are seeking. ''The clash of ideas,'' Mulroney noted solemnly, was the essence of democracy.

But the essence of democracy is neither an endless clashing about of ideas, nor universal harmony. It is that, in the end, these differences are confronted. There is a vote, the majority rules and the minority agrees to be bound by the verdict.

By the same token, the essence of a liberal democracy is that majority rule is tempered by sensitivity to the minority. At the individual level, this means the observance of human rights, and their protection in the Constitution. Likewise, Quebec may legitimately claim special immunity from majority interference in certain areas, and to entrench such protections in the Constitution.

But this protection is not open-ended. I have the right to free speech; I do not have the right to rob a bank. So the veto, even for Quebec, ought to be limited to safeguarding the equivalent of its inalienable rights - matters relating to its very identity as Quebec, such as language, culture, the civil law system - not a general guarantee that it can hold the Constitution to ransom for every power or privilege its government has its eye on.

Now combine this with Mulroney's second law: The concerns of Quebec must be attended to before any further constitutional reform. Having yielded all of the federal government's bargaining chips, the veto would lock in Quebec's advantage. Any progress on the rest of the constitutional agenda, such as Senate reform, will come only at the price of another Meech Lake - or not at all.

The Prime Minister is fond of saying that no one, not Trudeau and certainly not himself, would have proceeded with patriation without Ontario's approval. As far as Trudeau is concerned, this is nonsense: of course he would. Trudeau was prepared, remember, to bring the Constitution back without any province's approval.

Mulroney, moreover, seemed to have no problem with negotiating and signing a comprehensive free trade agreement with the U.S. over Ontario's strenuous objections - an amendment to the country's economic constitution that is arguably as important, divisive and binding as the patriation exercise. Which raises an interesting historical speculation: Suppose Quebec had opposed free trade, while Mulroney and the other provinces had supported it. Would he have proceeded? Would he have been right to?

Quebec should have a veto in certain matters to protect that which defines Quebec. Likewise, unanimity, which gives every province a veto, should be required in certain other matters, to protect that which defines Canada. But no one province, Quebec or any other, should have a blanket constitutional veto - far less that every province should have one - whether by force of law or hurt feelings.