THU OCT.26,1995 PG: B17

Yes vote not the end

FEDERALIST warnings of the dire economic costs of a secession attempt may not have had the desired effect on Quebeckers, but they have succeeded in scaring the wits out of a good many Canadians outside Quebec - so much so that many people may have concluded that a Yes vote would be enough to make sovereignty inevitable. If not actively desirable, one often hears, a negotiated split is preferable to the "uncertainty" surrounding a contested bid.

It is true that resisting secession would require that we not immediately accede to the demands of the Parti Quebecois, which those in the habit of compliance might find psychologically too much to bear. But anyone who gives any thought to the difficulties even an amicable secession would entail must soon conclude it is not just undesirable, but impossible. More than that, they must equally be led to appreciate how strong our own position is, and how weak that of the secessionist government of Quebec. To be blunt, we hold all the cards. We can resist secession, and we should.

A Yes vote has no legal force in itself. The referendum is not binding on any party, nor could it be. It is purely an exercise in consultation. Quebec would be as much a province of Canada the day after a Yes vote as it would the day before.

So would it be after a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). Mr. Parizeau, for obvious reasons, is inclined to present this almost as a formality. Talks on the sovereigntist "partnership," assuming they ever started, having gone nowhere - even the division of the debt could only lead straight to impasse - the National Assembly would "at that moment," according to the Premier, "declare the sovereignty of Quebec." Poof: You're sovereign.

The National Assembly can declare anything it likes. The declaration, like the referendum, would be of no legal effect. Doubters ask: How could we prevent it? But the real question is: How could they make it stick? It must always be kept in mind that federalism is the status quo. The institutions, laws and powers of Canada, great and many as they are, remain intact and on the ground in Quebec. It is the secessionists who face the enormous task of shoving the elephant's behind out the door.

They would encounter, among other things, the plain fact of its illegality: already established by Mr. Justice Robert Lesage's ruling last month, and undoubtedly to be confirmed in dozens of other cases after UDI brought by Quebeckers petitioning to protect their rights as Canadian citizens. This leaves aside a federal court challenge, or invalidation under the powers of disallowance or reservation. Does the government of Quebec ignore the courts? Does it fire all the judges? What obedient hacks does it find to put in their place? How does it enforce its own authority, the laws all being flat? And so long as its authority remained in doubt, international recognition would elude it.

Quebec's economy and society depends in countless ways on the continuing operation of federal laws: That's why the secessionists propose that they would all remain in place after sovereignty, until such time as they were changed. But so far as they do apply, they offer enormous scope for the federal government to limit the rebel government's manoeuvring room, in ways both large and small: for example, by freezing its financial assets.

In secessionist rhetoric, it is Ottawa that would be financially hamstrung, owing to the necessity of making payments on the debt. "When sovereignty comes, we will take all our taxes (from Ottawa) . . . and they will be waiting for us to pay them a part of interest on the federal debt," Mr. Parizeau chortles. "I say if you want to pout for a bit, go into the corner and pout. All it means is that your cheques will leave later."

Nice try, Jacques. The federal government does not get its revenues from the government of Quebec: Except for the GST, it gets them straight from the taxpayers of Quebec. Even if the PQ could somehow intervene to stop these, Ottawa would then halt the flow of transfer payments into Quebec. Given that Quebec is a net recipient, that means that, at least in the short term, the federal government would be in a stronger position to service the debt, not weaker.

The only question is how long the government of Quebec could survive, given its own heavy debts, skyrocketing interest rates, imploding revenues and so on. Who would lend to them? We might even see a financial institution or two collapse, as Quebeckers moved their deposits to safer ground. The Premier would try to blame Ottawa, as his government slashed social spending and laid off thousands of its employees. But he might find more and more fingers pointing his way, not least from the more panicky members of his own movement. No cost- free divorce, and no partnership. The backlash will not be pretty.