The separation threat is useful, that is, not only to the government of Quebec, but to empire-builders and axe-grinders across the land. Having lost the patriation debate in 1982, these statesmen have been engaged ever since in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the existing constitutional order, and they will go on trying for as long as they can persist in the nonsense that the fate of the entire country hangs on the vote of a few thousand confused Quebeckers.

And so we will be asked, for example, to treat seriously the "news," as transcribed from certain separatist clairvoyants in The Globe and Mail last week, that the United States would have rushed to recognize the independence of Quebec after a Yes vote, so as to prevent France from "extending its zone of influence." And, let us not forget, to escape the wrath of Bernard Landry and the Fighting Forces of Fredonia, or whatever army it is he proposes to lead.

We will not put a stop to this delirium unless we cut it off at its source: by dismantling the referendum bomb. It is beyond belief that an entire generation of national leaders could have subscribed to the idea that a single question, posed only to the people of Quebec, worded to the maximum advantage of the Parti Quebecois, proposing institutional arrangements that were known to be impossible, should have any force or validity. And we did it twice. It is hardly bold of the Prime Minister to suggest, however indirectly, that he will not stand for a third. It is the beginning of sanity.

I don't say this will be easy. It is decidedly a hardball strategy. But then, in case you haven't noticed, hardball is what the separatists have been playing all along. The hardest ball of all, which some have already begun to talk about, would be to neuter provincial legislation under which a new referendum and subsequent declaration of sovereignty might be authorized, whether by invoking the federal power of disallowance, or, slightly less provocatively, by instructing the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec to set aside the bill, under the power of reservation. The PQ would then be faced with a choice: to withdraw the bill, change it, or simply proceed outside the law. Perhaps the last seems most likely - and alarming. But risky as this scenario might be, it is doubly risky for the PQ. Quebec is not a society full of people who have nothing to lose; it is a middle-class society with middle-class values, of which the rule of law is among the highest. More to the point, if a referendum were to pass, we would shortly have to confront the same prospect, as the failure of talks on the terms of secession would trigger a unilateral declaration of independence. Better to dare the PQ to "go illegal" before the referendum than after.

Too hard? Okay, try the knuckleball. Federalist leaders in Quebec have established their democratic bona fides through two previous referendums. We have it on no less an authority than Jacques Parizeau's that Daniel Johnson is a great democrat. The Liberal leader, then, would seem well placed to say to the PQ: We have already played this game. We won. You lost. The only reason you were even close was that you asked a trick question. So: We are not going to play by your rules any more. If you come back with the same question again, we will not participate. Do you hear me? We will boycott. Have your referendum, then. See how much legitimacy it has.

This is a potent weapon. More than words on paper, the foundation of democratic rule is legitimacy. The reason the referendum instrument has legitimacy, within Quebec and without, is that federalists have chosen to contest it. Until now, that might have seemed an inescapable necessity. But having fought, and won, two referendums, federalists might turn the "precedent" argument on its head: We believe in Quebeckers' right to choose, they might say, but this is an abuse of democracy. The experience in other countries is that, where the opposition boycotts a vote, its legitimacy rapidly implodes.

We needn't reject a vote of any kind. Either weapon, disallowance or boycott, might instead be used to bargain for a fairer question: separation, yes or no. Having confronted the PQ on this matter, federalists would enter such a contest with their credibility greatly enhanced. Rather than issuing vague and contradictory warnings about what we would or would not agree to after the vote, warnings which were manifestly not believed this time around, we would have demonstrated in a timely and convincing fashion our willingness to stare down the separatists.

This isn't to say that other, face-saving steps cannot be taken to help Quebeckers in from the limb they have put themselves out on. But we must begin to place some boundaries around this debate.