In all the unseemly squabbling over whether British Columbia should be considered a region, a province or simply a state of mind, the rest of this murky bit of constitutional smuggling has escaped scrutiny. There has probably never been a legislative initiative that so combines blunt unconcern with public opinion with a lazy reluctance to defend the national interest: ruthlessness in the service of spinelessness.
How it is imagined that national reconciliation can be achieved by ramming through this desultory package of constitutional leftovers in such a casual, almost contemptuous fashion is beyond all understanding. It seems to have been hatched with no more objective in mind than saving Daniel Johnson's job as leader of the Quebec Liberal Party. Even if it gets the government over the immediate hump of making good on the Prime Minister's last-minute promises during the referendum, it may do so at the cost of considerable long-term damage to the country.
The job-training component offers a small example. The federal government promises to withdraw from all training, apprenticeship and workplace-based programs. It will only presume to assist Canadian workers in need of training, on the solemn oath of the Prime Minister, "with the consent and co-operation of the provinces." As with the veto proposal, the government of Canada has agreed to be run by remote control out of the premiers' offices.
It has never been explained what public good would be achieved if job training were mishandled at the provincial level rather than the federal. Aside from the real answer - because Quebec demands it - we are given only the usual "closer to the people" mantra. Fine: Send the money straight to unemployed workers, and let them decide where to spend it. You can't get much closer to the people than that. But the federal government is just as capable of writing cheques as the provinces. And if we want workers to be able to work and train anywhere in the country, doesn't it make sense that it should be federal?
The more disturbing matter, however, remains the resolution recognizing Quebec as a distinct society, by virtue of its "French-speaking majority, unique culture and tradition of civil law." Yes, this is only a resolution, not even a law. But it remains as offensive in principle as ever. And the government is on record as favouring its inclusion in the Constitution. Whether or not that comes to pass, it has formally committed itself to an exclusionary definition of Quebec society.
Which was always the point. What was objectionable in the distinct- society clause was not the idea of difference from other provinces but rather the suggestion of sameness within Quebec. Supporters of such recognition are inclined to treat opponents as if they were simply blind or ignorant of the sociological facts of Quebec's distinctiveness. But as we have been reminded recently, sociological facts take on new meaning when placed in a political context.
When Jacques Parizeau hung the referendum defeat on the "ethnic vote," he, too, could be said to have been expressing a sociological fact: Ninety to 95 per cent of ethnic minorities voted No. But everyone knew what he really meant. (That noted sociologist Pierre Bourgault has refined Mr. Parizeau's analysis further. It was, he said, "the Jews, the Greeks and the Italians" who were to blame.)
So when Parliament is asked to formally recognize Quebec as "a distinct society," we are obliged to ask, in what respect is it distinct? Why, the French- speaking majority, of course. In which case, the government of Canada is only agreeing with Mr. Parizeau: The real Quebeckers, the ones who express its essence, are the French-speakers. The rest are just there for the ride. When, likewise, we refer to Quebec's "unique culture," whose exactly do we mean? The Jews', the Greeks' and the Italians'?
There's no way to get around the ugly idea at the core of this benign- sounding proposal. It is no better to define a society in terms of the language of its majority than in terms of their skin colour. Try it: "Canada is a white country, with black and yellow people also present." The further you probe, the more troubling the notion becomes. What does the government mean by undertaking "to be guided by this reality"? When Mr. Johnson says the recognition must be used to interpret the Charter of Rights, which rights in particular does he suggest must be watered down?
Perhaps, if we had more than two days to debate it, we might begin to find out.