As always, the best place to observe this is in the matter of Quebec. Until now, the position of the punditry on Quebec was well settled: panic, mixed with despair. Buoyed by the results of the October referendum, however, they have lately taken to urging the federal government to Do Something, on the theory that Something, whatever it is, must be better than Nothing. The Do-Somethings even have a Something in mind, called the "two-track" strategy, a position that now runs all the way from Keith Spicer to Preston Manning, with stops at Jeffrey Simpson, Gordon Gibson and the Matthew Barretts.

The first track is familiar enough. It is to make "offers" to Quebec - sorry, Quebec-and-every-other-province - the offers consisting of the powers the Government of Canada now exercises in whole or in part that the provinces would prefer to have to themselves, which is to say just about all of them. The second track, if Quebec finds the "offer" not to its liking, is to begin negotiations on secession - since Lord knows Quebeckers would never accept the cursed status quo - only with the terms having been laid out in advance by the federal government: no passport, no citizenship etc.

This last is said to be the "hard-line" or "tough-love" approach, as it would seem also to preclude a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) , to which it is feared a successful referendum would otherwise lead. It is also immensely, and suddenly, popular. Indeed, the other day even the Minister of Justice was heard to say the word "legality."

It probably doesn't matter that exactly the same people would have sneered at exactly the same idea barely a year ago - would, and did - with exactly the same force with which they now unanimously endorse it. The point is that the two- track approach - Mr. Spicer calls it New Canada or No Canada - is hardly a solution to the Quebec crisis. Indeed, it isn't really a two-track process at all, since the first track leads inexorably to the second track, and both lead directly to separation.

Let us begin with the "offers" to Quebec. In presenting such offers, we are telling Quebeckers that they are sovereign parties to a contract called Canada, and that unless the contract is to their satisfaction, they can walk away from it at any time. And if they can, they probably should: for to consent to be governed, even in part, by the Government of Canada, they must feel that it is their government; that is, they must feel themselves to be a part of the Canadian people. Yet the very receipt of offers confirms that they are not: that there are in fact two peoples.

This is why Deputy Premier Bernard Landry insists that relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada must be governed by a treaty, and not a constitution: for the one is a matter between two peoples, while the other concerns the governance of one. The effect of the "offers" track is to turn the constitution into a treaty - and so to guarantee its rejection. For if Quebeckers are, as this implies, a separate people, how can they be satisfied with any arrangement in which they are still subject to federal law or federal power? It would be an intolerable affront to their dignity and autonomy as a people.

This is the real point. It isn't just that there is no objective need to devolve powers to the provinces; no amount of rhetorical artistry can produce a convincing picture of the provinces of Canada suffering under the federal yoke. It is not merely that it is wrong, and not only wrong but base and foolish, to negotiate with a knife at your throat. The point, rather, about making offers is that it guarantees the very result it seeks to avert.

For that matter, so would the second track. Even to set out "hard" terms for secession is still to accept the legitimacy of secession itself. If, moreover, you are prepared to dictate terms, presumably you are prepared to enforce them: i.e. to prevent a secession bid that did not conform to your terms, such as a UDI. But if you could stop a UDI, why would you agree to a negotiated secession, the sovereigntists having thus been deprived of their only bargaining lever? Or if you would not prevent a UDI, then why go through this charade of setting terms you would not enforce - as, indeed, we would have signalled by agreeing to make offers under the first track?

It is sometimes said that separatists do not understand the rest of Canada, that they do not know us. Oh, they know us, all right.