A new kind of arms race
February 22, 2002
As a military matter, whether Canada joins in any future campaign against Iraq is irrelevant. The notion that the United States, in deliberating what to do about Saddam Hussein, would be swayed by the doubts of an "ally" whose meagre forces would have to hitch a ride on American transport planes just to make it to the war, let alone offer much in the way of supporting firepower (wrapped in their desert-hued blankets, hastily requisitioned to cover their forest-green uniforms, it must be all they can do to get a hand free to pull the trigger), must have them in stitches at the Pentagon. "You mean, we're supposed to invade Iraq all by ourselves? But, but, who's going to be there to lecture us when we take prisoners?" So let's leave us out of it. The larger issue remains: Are the Americans justified in seeking to depose Saddam? Perhaps the question is better put to the critics of the U.S.

administration's policy of "regime change." What, if anything, would they do about the Iraqi dictator? As is commonly the case, the critics have tossed up any number of different arguments against taking action. But none of them stands up to much scrutiny, and in more than one case they contradict one another.

A favoured gambit is to distinguish between the "war on terrorism," which they support - - now they do, at any rate -- and any broader campaign against rogue states like Iraq, which are busy acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The Prime Minister appeared to take this line while visiting Russia. Iraq, he said, may have "unacceptable armaments," but "it is completely different than the problems of terrorism." We are with them on terrorism, he said firmly, "and terrorism is in Afghanistan." Well, that's tidy. Terrorism is in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been subdued. Ergo, terrorism is solved. Show's over folks. Nothing to see here. The notion that the problem of terrorism might have something to do with the states that sponsor terrorism, or that those "unacceptable armaments" might be passed from terrorist state to terrorist organizations -- or be used by the former to protect the latter -- seems to elude Mr.

Chrétien, as it does many of the critics.

The two may once have been separate problems, with separate solutions. And the sort of tidy, legalistic solutions preferred by the critics -- containment, for states that wished us ill, legal prosecution, for terrorists -- might once have seemed plausible. But put the two together, arm the terrorists with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and we are faced with something entirely new. We are in a new kind of arms race, only this time the race is to find and stop the enemy before he can kill thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of people: Americans, Brits, Canadians, whatever. As, there can no longer be any doubt, he would, given the chance.

Ah, but as The Globe and Mail admonishes us, there is no "clear evidence of an Iraqi role in the Sept. 11 attacks." Actually, there's plenty, not limited to the famous meeting of Mohammed Atta with Iraq's top spymaster in Prague, just days before the event. But it's a red herring, in any event. The point is not to punish those responsible after the fact, but to prevent future atrocities, on a far grander scale. And of course, the Globe would be opposed to taking out Saddam even if there were such evidence. When it seemed as if Iraq might have been behind the wave of anthrax attacks, the Globe was sick with worry.

"It must be fervently hoped no such link is found," the paper prayed, for then the United States would be bound to respond.

If the suggestion is that there is no continuing link between Iraq and international terrorism, or that it does not pose a grave threat to the peace, it is simply contradicted by the facts. Saddam has already started two calamitous wars; he has already used chemical weapons, not only against enemy forces but against his own people; and he has spent a decade or more in a fervent and well-documented effort to develop nuclear weapons -- or at least, it was well-documented, until he kicked out the United Nations inspectors. He has convened a training school for terrorists in the suburbs of Baghdad, hosted conferences for al-Qaeda and related groups, and provided financial and logistical support for terrorist organizations.

What, then, are we to do? Should we do nothing, and hope that Saddam's nuclear ambitions do not succeed? Not bloody likely: the experts say he's two years away, tops.

Should we gamble, then, as some suggest, that having acquired them at such expense, he "would not dare" to use them? And, supposing he were capable of such rationality, that his clients would be as well? Well, it's a hope. Pity if we're wrong.

What about, as The Toronto Star advises, relying on "diplomacy, political pressure and economic sanctions" to do the job? Sanctions? Weren't they supposed to be one of the "root causes" of Sept. 11 -- the suffering children of Iraq and all that? The same sanctions that, as the Globe gleefully observes, have "failed utterly" to deter or even delay Saddam?

(Even so-called "smart sanctions," aimed only at items of military use, the paper notes, "would probably be equally ineffective.") Yes, yes, it would be better for the United States to seek international approval before invading. But that only raises the question of why such support would reasonably be withheld. Which, I wonder, is the greater folly: to be blind to the threat Saddam poses, or recognizing the threat, to seek every opportunity to do nothing about it?