The Premier of Alberta is mightily steamed that the federal Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Stephane Dion, should have presumed to lecture him, in one of his famous open letters, on the evils of secession.

In a scorching reply, pointedly addressed not to Mr. Dion but to the Prime Minister, Mr. Klein fairly screams with rage, insisting that separation is not on his government's "agenda" -- an accusation Mr.

Dion did not make -- and demanding that in future Mr. Dion address himself to his provincial counterpart, rather than to His Imperial Western Holiness himself.

It is hard to decide what is more objectionable in the Premier's reply: the ill temper, the self-importance or the disingenuousness. No one suggests Mr. Klein is about to lead the province out of Confederation.

Nor is there evidence of any serious secessionist movement in Alberta.

But there seems little doubt that it would suit Mr. Klein's purposes if there were, and less still that he is doing his best to encourage it. Or, at the very least, that he is doing nothing to discourage it.

There is no other sensible way to interpret certain statements in the province's recent Speech from the Throne. Why else would a government think to announce that "Albertans are committed Canadians," except to imply the opposite? Why the careful declaration that "Albertans want to be full and equal partners in Canada," as if they were prevented from being so now -- and might choose not to be in future?

This interpretation is hardly unique to me. The speech was received in much the same way by just about everyone in Alberta, reinforced by Mr. Klein's subsequent comments, to the effect that "separation is not on the table for discussion -- not right now." Mr. Klein protests that he is merely remarking upon a sentiment that is "out there." But while he says he disagrees with it, that is as far as he goes. Rather than declare, firmly and forcefully, that separatism is out of bounds, he blames the federal government for provoking it. No, he is not threatening to separate. He is merely threatening that others might do so, if Alberta's grievances are not addressed.

We have been this way before. It is the same good-cop/bad-cop routine that Quebec "federalists" have been performing for 40 years: deal with me now, or deal with them later. Nor is this the first time that Mr. Klein has played this game. During the Kyoto debate, he was moved to remark, not only that he "understood" the frustration of talk radio callers who advocated separation, but that "I feel the same way" -- only he believed "there is still hope." It is this sort of doubletalk that Mr. Dion was trying to get at.

Separatism is not a policy choice that one can either take or leave. It is not, as Stephen Harper put it, a distraction ("I don't think it accomplishes anything."). Nor is it, as Joe Clark suggested, "an option that Albertans should not consider." It is not an option at all.

It isn't that Albertans would be ill-advised to separate -- as if the idea were otherwise unobjectionable, but for certain practical consequences.

It is that it is illegitimate in principle: a profound breach of faith, a violation of the social contract on which democratic life depends. As Mr. Dion writes, "nothing justifies secession." Even the threat of it is "morally wrong in a democracy." Indeed, he notes, "nowhere in the world is the spectre of secession raised" as a means of settling political differences -- nowhere, that is, but Canada. When people in France or the United States disagree with the policies of the national government, they do not threaten to secede in order to get their way.

But Mr. Dion neglected to say why this is so. The reason people in other countries do not "call into question their belonging and attachment to their country" is because the option is not available to them. This isn't only a matter of legality. Though nearly every country outlaws secession, explicitly or implicitly, this is more an expression of a deeply held consensus than anything else. Secession is regarded as illegitimate, an unconscionable act of disloyalty.

But legality and consensus interact. The unwillingness of a society to frame such a law can itself affect its ability to maintain such a consensus, or indeed to conceive of such things as "disloyalty." Mr.

Klein's comments emerge from a political context in which secession has long been accepted as a legitimate political option. Consider what this means. A country that accepts the legitimacy of its own annihilation has conceded that it does not regard its existence as a fundamental good, a non-negotiable bottom line.

But if that's the case -- if the country's very existence is not a fundamental good -- then neither is anything else. At a practical level, it is impossible to enforce societal norms, if at any time a province can secede rather than comply. And so in time practice becomes principle, rationalization turns to relativism: The country that is unable to stand for its own right to exist soon learns not to stand for anything. Notions of loyalty, or patriotism, or solidarity, become obsolete, to be replaced by "conditional federalism" and other terms of art.

No other country functions in this way, for one very simple reason: No country can.