"Alors qu'en est-il du peuple qubecois? Il est constitué essentiellement de francophones...." In the great tradition of "never complain, never explain," Jacques Parizeau, to give him his due, has done neither. A year after his infamous tirade over "money and the ethnic vote," the former premier of Quebec has resurfaced saying more or less the same thing. Though much attention has been devoted to his differences with his successor over fiscal policy and such, of equal significance is his unapologetic revisiting, in yesterday's full-page essay in Le Devoir, of his referendum night theme.

"Who are we?" he asks Quebecers. And answers: We, the Quebecois, are French. Everyone else is simply here. Oh, the ethnic minorities and the natives and even the English have undoubtedly enriched Quebec society, in their own way. Once sovereignty was realized, they might even become part of it. But as for today, Quebec is "essentially constituted" of francophones.

If it is unsurprising that a pequiste notable should cling, even in the twilight of the twentieth century, to such a particularist vision, where some citizens are held to define the essence of a society while others are but worthy helpmates, it is more surprising that federalists should. Yet opinion in the nation's political class, inside Quebec and out, remains as fixed as ever on the dogma of distinct society. The Liberal Party of Canada has now formally committed itself to obtaining constitutional recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness, just as the Conservatives did earlier.

Outside of the editorial board of the Globe and Mail, few of its adherents betray any overt enthusiasm for the idea, nor any serious hope of its passage.

It has become a sort of ritual incantation, a thing no one believes but everyone must say. Yet it is telling enough of the bankruptcy of the country's leadership that they feel obliged to carry on ploughing this rut, and more revealing still when they try to defend it.

It is, they say, simply a recognition of reality, nothing more, a description of Quebec and by extension Canada. If they are inclined to be insufferably patronizing, they will add that it does not connote superiority or involve the transfer of cash, as if opposition to the idea could arise only from the clouded suspicions of a child of six. In many cases, they seem genuinely to believe that the rest of us are simply unaware of the reality of Quebec's distinctiveness. (Apparently, they speak a lot of French there).

One might begin by asking why it is necessary to include such recognitions of reality in the Constitution. It is not normally the business of a constitution to describe the essential features of a society: in most countries, that is left to the local tourist bureau. Elsewhere it is understood that constitutions should be limited to defining the rules under which a society is governed. There is a simple reason for this.

It may be a sociological fact that the majority of Quebecers are French- speaking, and the survival and success of the institutions and cultural traditions of Quebec is certainly a cause worth celebrating. But a sociological fact, placed in a political context, takes on a very different meaning. Parizeau would say in his defense, were he to feel such defense necessary, that he was merely describing a sociological fact: a majority of French-speakers did vote Yes, while non-francophones voted overwhelmingly No. On a certain counting of heads, one could agree that sovereignty was defeated by "the ethnic votes." But why divide the vote in ethnic terms? Why not by age, or sex? Why not say that "we" were defeated by the elderly, or by women? And why, above all, should a political leader make such a statement, so clearly dividing society into We and They? At the time, everyone took the proper sense of Parizeau's remarks, and was revulsed. Yet exactly the same analysis applies to the distinct society clause.

As a statement of fact, it is unobjectionable: Quebec is distinct, and no one would have it any other way. There is no prospect, ever, of any attempt to forcibly assimilate francophone Quebecers into the English-speaking majority. But to inscribe the language and culture of the majority into the constitution, to describe what makes Quebec's society distinct in law, is to say a very different thing.

It is to say that the real Quebecers, the ones who define its essence, are the French speakers: all others are simply there. Whether or not this has any juridical significance in terms of the rights of the minority, it is simply contrary to the most basic norms of a liberal democratic society. Try this experiment. Say: Canada is a majority white country, with people of other colours also present. A sociological fact? Indisputably. But in the constitution? Never.