Despite its massive unpopularity at the time, he said, thanks to recent federal initiatives "the provisions of Meech are today almost all in effect" -- yet without achieving its signal purpose of securing the government of Quebec's acceptance of the 1982 Constitution. "We got all of the anguish, and none of the benefits," the former prime minister observed.

As this is just the sort of facile rewriting of history that tends, with repetition, to become the authorized version, it is worth strangling this lie in its crib. It is sufficient to recall what the document actually contained.

The heart of Meech Lake (and of its bastard child, the Charlottetown accord) was of course the "distinct society" clause. This was no mere symbolic statement; it was neither part of the preamble to the Constitution, as the Quebec Liberal party had originally demanded, nor a simple resolution of Parliament, as the present federal government later had passed. It was an interpretive clause, with real legal weight.

"The Constitution of Canada," it read -- the whole thing, every line -- "shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with ... the recognition that Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society." And more: "The role of the legislature and Government of Quebec is to preserve and promote the distinct identity of Quebec." There was a disclaimer that "nothing in this section derogates from the powers, rights or privileges" of any government. But no such assurance was given with respect to the Charter of Rights, nor was there anything to preclude the government of Quebec from using the clause to extend its powers.

Needless to say, no such amendment has been passed, nor will any like it.

Nor was the constitution amended to contain the accord's explicit partitioning of the country into two Canadas: one, made up of "French- speaking Canadians, centred in Quebec but also present elsewhere in Canada," the other comprising "English-speaking Canadians, concentrated outside Quebec but also present in Quebec." But that was only one part of Meech. The rest is taken up with installing the supremacy of the provinces at large, not only in their own spheres, but over federal institutions. The provinces were to be given effective control of the Senate, by a provision requiring the federal government to choose Senators from lists of provincial nominees. The Supreme Court was to be provincialized by the same method. Again, no such amendments were ever passed.

The Government of Canada, further, was to be constitutionally obliged to compensate provinces that opted out of national shared-cost programs in areas of provincial jurisdiction, provided the province "carries on a program or initiative that is compatible with the national objectives." And who would decide whether an initiative was "compatible with the national objectives?" Why the Supreme Court, of course -- the same one that had just been handed over to the provinces.

That in no way compares with the the federal government's undertaking in the last Parliament. True, it promises compensation to opting out provinces - - but whether a provincial program qualifies is ultimately for the federal government to decide. If it doesn't like the result, it only has to revoke the pledge. By contrast, the only way to repair the Meech opting-out provision would have been to amend the constitution.

And how was that to be done? Answer: It couldn't be done. Meech would have given every province a veto over virtually every section of the Constitution: the general amending formula was to be unanimity. Again, this is scarcely comparable to the federal government's legislated commitment to "loan" its own veto to the five regions, an offer it can withdraw at any time.

Had Meech passed, the constitution would have become a locked vault.

Whether or not Quebec's constitutional demands were satisfied by the Accord -- a matter of some dispute -- it is clear that Senate reform for the West, or provincial status for the territories, or indeed any other amendment would have been impossible.

Not that they wouldn't have tried. The Accord made provision for First Ministers' conferences on the constitution "at least once each year" in perpetuity. Ditto a conference on the economy: "at least once each year." By law. Forever. It is not too much to say that the locus of power in national affairs would shift inexorably from the cabinet, responsible to Parliament, to a permanent secretariat of the First Ministers, responsible to no one.

The immigration agreements recently concluded with several provinces are arguably the only major provision of the Meech Lake Accord to have been enacted in recognizable form -- though, again, these have no constitutional footing. As for the rest, they remain, blissfully, a nightmare from the past.