This is a bit rich, on the face of it. Chretien has, it bears repeating, shepherded the Liberal party to two consecutive majorities, a feat that eluded all of his Liberal predecessors as Prime Minister since 1953. What is more, Chretien has put together his majorities without also taking a majority of seats in Quebec, the first time *that's* been accomplished since 1917. If it's a Prime Minister from outside Quebec you want, then in a sense he's your man.

Ah, chants the chorus, but that's the point: he can't win Quebec. For the good of the country, Chretien must step aside, in favour of someone who can "win the next referendum." Someone like, well, like Paul Martin, for instance.

If it isn't too "divisive" a thing to say, no one would be suggesting Chretien should resign because of an inability to win the West. It seems odd to have to point it out, but, outside of Ontario, the Grits did better in Quebec than they did in any other region. What is more, Quebec was the only part of the country in which the Liberals increased their share of the popular vote over 1993.

With 36 per cent of the ballots cast in the province, the Liberals attracted more than three votes to every two for the Conservatives under Jean Charest, supposedly the great federalist hope in Quebec. Even if we assume the Tories got no votes at all from anglo- and allophone voters, that means the Liberals substantially outpolled the Tories among francophone Quebecers, whose aversion to Chretien is well known.

Now, the point of all this is not to wind up the Chretien bandwagon. But if the Grits are giving any thought to dumping a sitting prime minister -- a proposition I very much doubt -- or if Chretien himself is tempted to resign - - an even slimmer prospect -- the very worst reason to do so is for the sake of "winning the next referendum." It has yet to sink in among the general punditry, but if there is another referendum -- itself less than an even money bet, after the Bloc's showing -- it will be totally unlike any previous exercise. There was a time when federalists, shamefully, could be frightened into contesting a referendum whose rules, timing, question, and fundamental assumption -- that Quebecers were entitled not only to vote themselves out of the federation, but to vote themselves into a new "partnership" with the rest of Canada -- were tailored exclusively to the separatists' needs. But that time has passed.

The Liberals' rising fortunes in Quebec, and the Bloc's decline, come, let us remember, *after* the decision to challenge Quebec's declared right to unilateral secession before the Supreme Court; *after* Inter-Governmental Affairs minister Stephane Dion's mid-campaign announcement that, in any future referendum, the federal government would seek a hand in writing the question; *after* Chretien's blunt statement that a majority of 50 per cent plus one in favour of secession would not be accepted as a sufficient mandate.

None of these caused the predicted rallying of Quebecers to the secessionist cause: quite the opposite, it appears. But the larger point is, the Liberals are committed. There will be no replay of 1995. And just in case Quebecers didn't get the message, there sits Preston Manning and his 59 Reform colleagues. Partnership? Fuhgeddaboutit.

What seems equally clear is that the Parti Quebecois are highly unlikely to agree to the federal government's terms: not on unilateral secession, not on the question, not on the majority. At some point, possibly as early as this fall, the crisis will come to a head. If the PQ proceeds with a referendum in defiance of federal directives, the federal government will have some very fast decisions to make. At the very least, it would have to boycott the proceedings. Depending on events, even stiffer measures might be required.

The issue then will not be winning the referendum, but managing the crisis - - not least within the government itself. The Prime Minister would face challenges enough even to hold his cabinet together, let alone the country.

At that time, the advantages of incumbency and experience would be decisive factors in favour of retaining Chretien, even assuming the party could agree on a replacement. Certainly Martin's backers should not assume anything.

Chretien's personal qualities can be debated at some more convenient interval.

But this is no time to change leaders.