Okay. Let's assume Microsoft, as the maker of the Windows operating system that runs 90 per cent of the world's personal computers, is a threat to the public good, and not merely a fading empire struggling to maintain control of the high-tech equivalent of the horse and buggy: the full-feature, everything-in-a-box desktop computer. Now: What do we do about it?

It is one thing for the U.S. Justice department to try to put a stop to some of the restrictive practices of which Microsoft is accused: notably, forbidding computer makers, as a condition of license for Windows, from loading any other internet browser software but Microsoft's own Internet Explorer 4.

Given its strangehold on the operating system end of the business, Microsoft should not have the right to shut out its downstream competitors, even so successful a rival as Netscape.

But it's a much trickier business to prohibit Microsoft from any attempt to link its operating system with its browser, even on a non-exclusive basis: either by tied-sales agreements or, as in the forthcoming Windows 98, by physically integrating the two. This goes way beyond mere restrictive practices. It invites the state to decide what should and should not go into an operating system. As a U.S. appeals court judge ruled in a previous case against Microsoft, this "would put judges and juries in the unwelcome position of designing computers." The Justice department's blockbuster anti-trust suit proposes forcing Microsoft to "unbundle" Internet Explorer from Windows 98. Consumers and computer makers would then be free to take their pick – Windows with IE4, or Windows Lite – allowing other browsers to compete on an equal basis. That sounds like a good idea, until you consider how it would work in practice.

As things stand, Microsoft gives away its browser for free, a practice it would undoubtedly continue. Since the cost of Windows-IE4 and Windows Lite would be the same, it's not hard to predict which one consumers would choose. Nothing much would have changed. So in addition to designing computers, the government would also have to decide what price Microsoft should charge for its browser – that is, what price above zero, Microsoft's preferred fee.

This is a shade less harebrained than the Justice department's other proposed remedy, of forcing Microsoft to bundle Netscape's Navigator browser alongside IE4 – as if what consumers really needed, in place of monopoly, was a government-approved duopoly. But it's hardly a solution.

So some have proposed more radical surgery: breaking up Microsoft, much along the lines of the breakup of AT&T in the early 1980s. One of the new "Baby Bills" would own Windows; the other would hold Microsoft's other products. Again, the idea is to give the makers of competing software an even break.

But this model, too, has problems: namely, the continuing monopoly of the Windows operating system. This is where the AT&T analogy breaks down.

It's the difference between hardware and software: you just can't divide blocks of programming code into neat categories like you can local and long-distance telephone networks. Even if the Windows company were regulated, as the "common carrier"of the software industry, it wouldn't be long before the software began mutating and expanding exactly as it did under Microsoft, as its new owners added their own enhancements. We'd be right back where we started, with the same problems of definition we have now.

So let me propose another solution, one that would respect Microsoft's right to improve its flagship product, while still allowing for competition in other markets. It's simple: just let anyone sell Windows. Rather than ban Microsoft from bundling IE4 with Windows, let Netscape package Windows with Navigator. Or let Corel offer Windows along with WordPerfect. You might give Microsoft a royalty on each unit of Windows sold in this way.

But it would no longer be in a position to tell computer makers, "no IE4, no Windows." Not only would this open up full-throttle competition in the software applications market: it would break Microsoft's monopoly over the operating system. Yet it would not require breaking up Microsoft, or ask the government to define what should or should not be part of Windows. Indeed, neither would Microsoft. The market would. Some firms might offer a bare- bones version of Windows. Others, for a higher price, might tack on lots of extras. Consumers could choose which one worked for them.

Doubtless Microsoft would protest at any such "compulsory licensing" scheme, even with the royalty provision. But given the alternatives the government has in mind, it might be the lesser poison.