As a proponent of the rule of law, the federal government has but one argument to make -- that any attempt on the part of Quebec to secede unilaterally would be in violation both of the constitution of Canada and of international law. By contrast, opponents of the reference, both within the sovereignty movement and without, make a blizzard of arguments in support of the notion that there are no limits, legal or otherwise, on Quebecers' right to secede.
Indeed, the lawyer appointed to make the separatist case, the so-called "friend of the court," makes at least a half a dozen all on his own. For much of the day, federal lawyers patiently worked their way through them, discarding each in its turn. A sampling: 1. This is a political question, not a legal one; the court should not rule on political matters. There is no doubt that Quebec's claim of a right to secede is steeped in political controversy. But so are many issues the court is asked to resolve. The important point is not whether the question is political, but whether it is purely political. So long as there is any legal content to the reference, then the court not only has the right to decide the matter, but, according to the terms of the Supreme Court Act, the obligation.
2. The case is hypothetical; there is no current legislation proposing that Quebec should secede. No, but there certainly was: Bill 1, introduced by the Parti Quebecois in September, 1995, which authorized secession no later than one year after a separatist referendum victory. And while Bill 1 died with the defeat of the referendum in October of that year, the PQ has made it abundantly clear that it intends to present similar legislation, should it win re-election.
The "hypothetical" argument, as a federal lawyer put it, amounts to saying that "before is too soon, and after is too late." Meanwhile, the government of Quebec has not hesitated to argue in two different court cases that it has the right to secede unilaterally -- that is until, having failed to have either case dismissed, it withdrew from each, claiming the courts had no jurisdiction.
If the government of Quebec is entitled to argue in court that it has a legal right to secede, or that if it does not, that it is not bound by the law, then the federal government is surely entitled to argue the contrary.
No, the Court has not been asked to rule on an appeal of a lower-court ruling, as is more common. That's what these references are for: to settle questions of law that might otherwise be the subject of any number of separate cases.
3. Whatever the text of the constitution may say, it is trumped by the principle of "effectivity," or effective control. That is, if a separatist government could establish exclusive and uncontested authority over all of the territory of Quebec, then whatever laws might have applied under the previous constitutional order -- that is, the one it replaced -- would become something of a dead letter. At some point, both domestic and international law would simply have to adjust to the facts on the ground.
Perhaps this will prove to be the case -- one day. But it is a bit much to argue that the principle of effective control should apply before effective control has been established -- that the Constitution should be suspended in the present, as the federal lawyer put it, "because one hopes to overturn it in future." Talk about hypotheticals.
4. Secession is authorized under international law; or at any rate, it is not expressly forbidden. Lots of things aren't expressly forbidden under international law: murder, for instance. That doesn't make them legal.
International law doesn't prohibit secessionists from trying to secede, but neither does it prohibit existing states, like Canada, from trying to preserve their territorial integrity. The issue then is resolved by effective control.
As far as a positive right to secede, however, international law is crystal clear. While sub-national groups are indeed entitled to the right of self- determination -- in the sense of democracy and the preservation of their cultural identity -- that is not the same as a right to secede. Only where the seceding territory is in the position of a colony vis-a-vis the existing state can it claim the sanction of international law. Otherwise, the territorial integrity of states must be preserved.
What, then, is left of the right to secede? If neither domestic nor international law supports it, if "effective control" is a wish disguised as a deed -- if, in short, we strip away the various pretenses of legality -- then we are left with the proposition that the government of Quebec is simply above the law. In which case, why does it bother even to pass any?